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Abstract
A unique dataset of social and economic networks collected in 60 rural Gam-
bian villages is used to study the ways in which households with links outside the
village (that are considered as a proxy for market connections) behave in the lo-
cally available exchange networks for land, labor, input and credit. Using measures
gleaned from the social network analysis literature, the econometric results at both
household and link (dyadic) level provide evidence of: (i) substitutability between
internal and external links, and (ii) substitutability between internal reciprocation
and external links. These findings provide support for the transformation process
of primitive economies described in a long tradition of anthropological work as well
as recent theoretical models.
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“The pattern of symmetrical and reciprocal rights is not difficult to understand if we
realize that it is first and foremost a pattern of spiritual bonds between things which are
to some extent parts of persons, and persons and groups that behave in some measure as
if they were things.”
Mauss (1923, “The Gift”)
1 Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the empirical analysis of the process of
transformation in traditional rural societies using a network perspective. Using a unique
database of economic networks (land, labor, inputs and credit) collected in 60 villages in
rural Gambia, where traditional non-monetary economic exchanges -gift economy- pre-
vail, the behavior of households involved in market transactions is studied.
The transition from primitive economic activities to more complex exchanges that
eventually lead to market economies (or to alternative modern economic systems) was a
relevant element in the conception of classical economic theory and a key issue for early
economic sociologists, as can be seen in the works of Thorsten Veblen, Max Weber and, in
particular, Karl Polanyi. In the latter’s conception of the great transformation, modern
societies are shaped through the transition from a network of communitarian recipro-
cal exchanges to institutionalized market interactions (Polanyi, 1944). The concept of
primitive economies as reciprocal exchanges is largely based on Malinowski’s influential
description of the production system of the Trobriand islanders (Malinowski, 1921, 1922),
which also provides the foundation for Mauss’ analysis of a gift economy.
The transformation process is subsequently formalized by Kranton (1996). In her
model, agents can choose either reciprocal exchanges with other agents whose prefer-
ences, production costs and other relevant characteristics are known, or market trans-
actions with anonymous agents, using money as a medium of exchange. If the cost of
searching for trading partners is higher than the benefit obtained from consumption di-
versification offered by markets, then agents will prefer reciprocal exchanges. One of the
main results of Kranton (1996) is that reciprocity can be enforced even if markets exist as
an alternative for transactions. In particular, she predicts that reciprocal exchanges will
be pervasive in settings such as the Gambian villages, where common features of rural
societies are predominant, namely high costs to access market exchanges, non-anonymity
(therefore high value on the future utility from a relationship), and homogeneous con-
sumption preferences.
The descriptions of ethnographic and anthropological literature and the predictions of
models a la Kranton (1996) have not been matched with rigorous quantitative evidence
about the transformation process.1 Most of the empirical evidence of behavior under
different levels of market exposure has been collected through experimental games across
different societies. A robust finding, replicated in experiments played in different groups
and contexts, is that communities more exposed to market are fairer in transactions with
1A summary of studies focusing on the influences of markets on behavior and preferences is provided
by Bowles (1998). More related to the framework of the present study, Barrett (2008) reviews the
literature related to market participation of smallholders in Africa.
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strangers, as measured by the amount of money offered in the ultimatum game and the
dictator game (Henrich et al., 2004 and Henrich et al., 2010). Indirectly, this result im-
plies that individuals belonging to groups that participate in the market are less likely to
get involved in reciprocated transactions. In other words, the difference between gift and
commodity exchange is that a gift establishes a feeling-bond between two people, which
is absent from a commodity transaction (Hyde, 1983).
Following the contribution of Kranton and Minehart (2001), I will consider a market
as a network of buyers and sellers that establish a link between each other. The data
from Gambian villages provide information regarding the existence of a link connecting
a particular household for a transaction outside the village in each network. While most
of the households in the data have at least one economic link with their fellow villagers
(and in most cases several links), only a few households have links outside the village. I
consider these outside links as a proxy for a market connection, an assumption supported
by observations on the field and by empirical tests provided below. On the other hand,
and in line with previous studies described in the next section, the economic links within
the village are assumed to represent some kind of gift exchange.
Another important assumption behind the study is the idea, first formalized by de Jan-
vry et al. (1991), that the problem of missing or failing markets may be better under-
stood as a household instead of a commodity specific phenomenon. Even if markets exist,
transaction costs that exceed the utility gain from the transaction will push a particular
household outside the market. Moreover, there are general equilibrium effects, in which
failures of an important market, such as credit, labor or food, can lead to exclusion from
exchanges in other markets. While the predictions of de Janvry et al. (1991) are not
directly tested, the concept of household-level market exclusion is adopted.2
For the empirical analysis, two specific hypotheses derived from previous descriptions
of the transformation process will be explored: (i) Substitutability between internal and
external exchanges, i.e. households with external economic links are less likely to be in-
volved in economic interactions within the village; and (ii) reciprocation versus market,
i.e. households with external economic links are less likely to be involved in reciprocated
exchanges with fellow villagers. Network based measures of degree centrality (number of
links in each network) and reciprocity are used to quantify economic interactions inside
the village. The relationship of these variables with external economic interactions is
analyzed in various empirical specifications. Firstly, the predicted probability of external
link existence is used to implement a propensity score matching estimator to compare a
set of households with similar observed characteristics. The analysis at the household-
level is expanded by implementing a specification in the spirit of the recent contributions
of Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) and Banerjee et al. (2012), where variables gleaned from
network measures are included into a linear model. Taking advantage of the network
structure of the data, the main hypotheses are further tested at the dyadic (link between
2Most of the previous applied econometric studies specifically dealing with the issue of market partic-
ipation are efforts to test models in the spirit of de Janvry et al. (1991). Goetz (1992) combines bivariate
probits and 2SLS in a sample of Senegalese rural households and finds some differences in the determi-
nants of grain market participation for buyers and sellers. Using structural estimation, Key et al. (2000)
show the importance of transaction costs in data for Mexican ejidos. Bellemare and Barrett (2006) use
an ordered Tobit model to show the sequentiality in the decisions of market entry and volumes to be
transacted for rural households in East Africa.
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households) level, following the specification first proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert
(2007).3
In all the econometric specifications I find support for the main hypotheses. External
links are negatively related to household degree, and therefore there is evidence of sub-
stitutability between internal exchanges and external links. This effect is observed only
within each network and not across networks. In terms of the reciprocation versus market
hypothesis, the analysis also provides evidence of less reciprocated exchanges for house-
holds with external links, again mainly within each network, but also across networks
in some cases. These results are generally robust to the different econometric specifi-
cations and alternative methods to control for village- and household-level unobserved
heterogeneity, but the effects are not always present for every network. The findings
are suggestive in terms of providing empirical evidence for the hypotheses using detailed
network data. However, they should not necessarily be interpreted in causal terms given
potential endogeneity problems that might remain unsolved with the techniques that the
data allow me to use.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the setting and data
collection. In section 3 formal definitions of the network measures are presented. Section
4 introduces the empirical strategy while the following section presents the main empirical
results. A final section suggests policy implications of the findings and concludes.
2 Context and Data
2.1 Setting: economic exchanges in rural Gambia
The setting of the study largely resembles the characteristics of rural West Africa. Gam-
bian villages are mostly engaged in basic subsistence agriculture, combined in some cases
with cash crop production -mainly groundnuts- with the use of basic technologies (Gajigo
and Saineb, 2011). Some villages also rely on fishing and livestock rearing as comple-
mentary economic activities. In the small villages in which the surveys were conducted
kinship relationships are very common and are usually dominated by the lineage of the
village founders and the oldest settlers. The village is organized into compounds, a group
of huts surrounded by a grass fence where members of the same family live and organize
daily activities together. The majority of labor activities are carried out by compound
members organized in one or more dabadas or farm production units (Webb, 1989). Most
of the time a compound can be identified as a household, but in some cases there are
members identified as independent households inside the compound.4
While many of the production activities are organized within the compound, there
is also an active exchange with other households in the village, mainly through non-
monetary transactions embedded in the traditional social norms and a network of recip-
rocal exchanges.5 As described by Shipton (1990) “in The Gambia, virtually everything
3To my knowledge, the only study that analyzes reciprocity in rural societies in a dyadic framework
is the recent contribution by Schechter and Yuskavage (2011).
4A detailed description of the organization of activities within compounds is provided by Carney and
Watts (1990) and von Braun and Webb (1989).
5The most active period of economic exchanges between households in the village occurs before,
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is lendable and at times will be lent. This includes nearly all factors of agricultural pro-
duction land, labor, livestock, seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and farm tools. Craft tools,
vehicles, and household goods are also lent”. For the present study these exchanges are
grouped in four networks -land, labor, inputs (basically tools, seeds and fertilizers), and
credit- described in detail below.
Formal land titles are very rare in rural Gambia. Instead, the unwritten rights over
land usage are determined by the descendants of the village’s founders, generally the
village chief (Alkalo) and his direct relatives. In some cases, the kabilo (clan) heads, who
might not be related to the founder’s lineage but represent the descendants of other early
settlers, are entitled to permanent usage rights. As noted by Webb (1989), the rights over
land are closely related to the old social structure, with the former highest castes having
the most productive plots. All other villagers must borrow plots on either a seasonal or
an annual basis from them, in agreements that can also last for several years (Chavas
et al., 2005). Sometimes other individuals own small plots of land outright that can be
lent or rented, usually to individuals outside the village.
In terms of labor exchanges between villagers, to deal with a shortage of family workers
(particularly before and during the rainy season) households usually invite other villagers
or outsiders to help with household tasks in exchange for various kinds of goods, labor
or even a marriage arrangement. Other alternatives available in some villages are the
use of kafos, an organized workforce of villagers from various households who participate
in the provision of public goods but who can also be hired for a fixed wage, and the
use of strange farmers (Swindell, 1978), individuals from outside the village who provide
part-time labor in exchange for the right to use part of the family plot for their own
benefit. In the villages surveyed, the hiring of kafos was rarely observed (less than 1% of
the interviewed households heads declared they borrowed labor from more than 5 other
households) and the use of strange farmers cannot be identified due to data limitations.
The input network is defined in the survey as exchanges of means of production that
imply a monetary or opportunity cost for the lender, such as tools, cattle, fertilizer, seeds
and the like. Livestock are usually lent for milk, manure and transport during long pe-
riods, and sometimes also lent to relatives outside the village, as a means of avoiding
the loss of an entire herd in the case of disease or theft (Shipton, 1990). As for other
agricultural inputs, the lending can take the form of a bilateral household exchange or a
centrally organized process by some of the villager groups. The external links relate to
the acquisition and distribution of these inputs from and to other villages, rural markets
or urban centers.
The credit exchanges between villagers generally follow the Islamic prescription of not
charging any interest rate to the borrower, and are related to risk-sharing activities of
support for relatives and friends, enmeshed in the network of mutual obligations created
by the other types of economic and social exchanges (Shipton, 1990). Apart from the
direct borrowing of money from another household in the village, there is also the possi-
bility of obtaining credit from external sources, both informal and formal (mainly rural
development banks or microcredit agencies), or from some village-level rotating saving
and credit associations (ROSCAs), locally known as osusus. Other forms of organized
during and after the rainy season.
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saving, such as the money-keepers and the village bank, are usually available.
2.2 Data collection and description
The data were collected by the author, other researchers, and local collaborators in the
context of the baseline survey for the impact evaluation at national level of a Community-
Driven Development Program, conducted between February and May of 2009. 60 Gam-
bian villages with populations between 300 and 1,000 inhabitants, mainly in rural areas
(just 4 villages are in semi-urban areas), were randomly selected using area sampling at
the ward level, a smaller geographical division that tends to be homogeneous in geograph-
ical but heterogeneous in socio-cultural terms.
Given the costs associated with implementing LSMS-type surveys for all households
in a village, structured group interviews geared to collect quantitative information were
implemented instead. Therefore, village censuses were carried out through gatherings
co-organized with the Alkalo and district-level officers. In such village meetings it was
possible to obtain relatively coarse quantitative information -with a particular focus on
socio-economic interactions- for almost all households in each village (the median village-
level coverage rate is 94%).6 The survey has two sections: a standard (and very lean)
household questionnaire designed to collect a vector of household characteristics and a
set of questions specifically designed to understand the economic networks in the village.
The respondents were asked to name villagers with whom they had exchanges, during the
past year, in terms of (i) land, (ii) labor, (iii) inputs, and (iv) credit. We also collected
information about networks created by kinship and marriages and, importanly for the
purpose of the present study, about connections external to the village in each of these
networks.
We finally interviewed 2,886 persons, but the sample is reduced to 2,810 when incom-
plete data are removed. In Table 1 the main variables of the household questionnaire are
summarized. Average household size is 12.7 members, but some households have even
more than 50 members (approximately 1% of the sample) a fact explained by the polyg-
amous nature of Gambian rural society, with 45% of households declaring to have more
than one wife. Only a very small number of household heads are females (7%) or non-
Muslims (4%). 16% of the respondents declared having some kind of formal education
(although a substantial fraction of the villagers received some kind of koranic education
and usually master basic Arabic language skills) and the average (self-declared) annual
income per capita is 3,565 Gambian Dalasis, which corresponds to approximately $380
(in constant 2005 and PPP adjusted dollars from World Development Indicators), with
only around 12% of this income stemming from agricultural activities. Around half of
the respondents declare to have current or former household members who work outside
the village, including 19% who receive remittances from overseas migrants outside Africa.
41% claim to produce some sort of cash crops.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the data on networks, which are analyzed in
detail in the next section. Meanwhile, it is important to point out that these data support
6Having census network data implies that in the empirical analysis there is no need for the adjustment
in the estimates that are necessary in sampled networks proposed by Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011).
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the idea that most of the economic interactions take place within the village instead of
outside it. When the four economic networks are taken together (fifth row of Table 2), it
can be seen that 76% of the households do not have any links that enable them to bring
something from outside the village and 83% do not have links that enable them to send
something outside the village (columns 3 and 4 respectively). On the other hand, only
less than 15% of the households declare having no links in these networks with fellow
villagers (internal autarky).
More details related to the data collection methodology, as well as an extensive anal-
ysis of the data can be found in Jaimovich (2011a).7
While this database is unique in many aspects, there are limitations that constrain
the possibilities of the empirical analysis. In first place, the data are available only for
one period, therefore only a cross-sectional analysis is possible. In particular, dynamic
features in household’s behavior can not be captured, limiting the observed economic in-
teraction inside and outside the village to those that have taken place in the year before
the survey. Another issue with the data is that the relevant unit for economic exchanges
is the household, therefore the complexities of intra-households allocation of resources
are not captured and the external exchanges of others members apart from the household
head can be misrepresented.
3 Definitions: Network measures.
3.1 Internal exchanges
Each household will be considered as a node i in each of the m economic exchange net-
works, with m = {LAND,LABOR, INPUT,CREDIT}. The internal exchanges consist
of a set of nodes in each village v belonging to nv = 1, ...,Nv where nv is the number of
households inside each village. The existence of a link between households i and j in the
network m will be measured as a binary variable:
`ij(m) = 1 if a link is reported in the data, `ij(m) = 0 otherwise.
where `ij(m) is a directed link from i to j, which implies that the former lends m to
the latter. If the opposite is true (i borrows from j), then the link will denoted as `ji(m).
Given this definition, the internal exchanges will consider the existence of a link but
not the intensity of the exchange, because this information is not available. In other
words the analysis concentrates on the extensive rather than the intensive margin of
economic exchanges.
While the data do not provide information in terms of the specific type of exchange
that a link implies, I will consider that a link in the network of internal economic ex-
changes represents some kind of gift exchange. This assumption is largely supported by
7Jaimovich (2011a) is a chapter of my PhD dissertation (Jaimovich, 2011b). Versions of the chapter
have also been circulated as an unpublished working paper, where some of the results discussed in the
present study are reported.
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the description of the economic activities presented in section 2.1, as well as the anecdotal
observations during the fieldwork.
A basic metric of the level of internal exchanges of a node i in a network m is its
degree centrality, di(m), measured as the number of links involving this particular node.
In the data it is possible to make a distinction in terms of the directionality of the link. If
the link goes from i to j, then it will be counted in the measure of the out-degree. Formally:
Out-degree: douti (m) = ∑j `ij(m).
In the economic networks, the out-degree of i is related to its position as a lender.
When the link goes in the other direction, from j to i, it will be counted as part of the
in-degree of i:
In-degree: dini (m) = ∑j `ji(m).
For economic networks the in-degree is a characteristic of i as borrower.
The first panel of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the average degree of the
households in the sample, both as borrowers and as lenders. The average degree for the
economic networks is always below 1, indicating that for many households di(m) = 0 (in-
ternal autarky). This fact is captured in the fourth panel of Table 2, which indicates that
between 40% and 50% of the households do not have any links for each specific network.
Among the networks, INPUT has households with higher degree and CREDIT with
lower, but these differences are not statistically significant given the large variation in the
distribution of degrees.
3.2 Reciprocity
One of the main characteristics of tribal economies, as described by Malinowski (1921)
and Mauss (1923), is the reciprocity of exchanges. Reciprocity can be defined in various
ways, but basically is linked to the concept of non-pecuniary transactions in which the
provision of a good or service is expected to be rewarded in the future. This reciprocity
can be expected in the long term, particularly in villages such as those in the present
study, where social relations are long-lasting. This is a limitation for the cross-sectional
data used in the empirical analysis, but at least it is possible to observe whether an eco-
nomic exchange was reciprocated within the year before the survey was conducted.
I will limit myself to the description of reciprocity within the m economic networks for
which detailed information is available. Given that the data about links are directed, it is
possible to observe whether any specific link has a counterpart in the opposite direction.
If a link is bidirectional, meaning that the lender was also a borrower in a transaction
with a given household, this link will be considered as reciprocated. In particular:
Recipij(m) = 1⇔ `ij(m) = 1 and `ji = 1
where `ji is a link between i and j in any of the m networks. Therefore, reciprocation
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can exist within the same network (e.g. reciprocating input borrowing with input lend-
ing) or with another network (e.g. reciprocating input borrowing with land lending).
As in the case of household degree, the reciprocal relation is directional. For each
household i, reciprocal out − degree is defined as:
Recipouti (m) = ∑j `ij(m)`ji.
Similarly, reciprocal in − degree is defined as:
Recipini (m) = ∑j `ji(m)`ij.
The second panel of Table 2 shows a general description of the reciprocal degree of
households in the sample, taken as a percentage of household’s degree in each network.
INPUT is the network with more reciprocation, with an average of around half of the
links, followed by LABOR, where nearly 35% of the links are reciprocated. In the case of
LAND and CREDIT , on average approximately only 20% of the links are reciprocated.
3.3 External connections
The existence of an external link in each of the m economic networks is reported in the
data, but not the identity and location of the specific agent with whom villagers have it.
Neither the intensity of the link nor the existence of more than one external link in each
network are reported. Given these limitations of data, the external link will be taken as
a binary variable:
Exti(m) = 1 if an external link is reported, and Exti(m) = 0 otherwise.
Given this, and in a similar fashion as in the case of internal exchanges, the analysis
will capture the effect of external connections at the extensive instead of the intensive
margin. A distinction will be made in terms of external links created to bring some-
thing to the village (Extini (m)) or to take something out something from the village
(Extouti (m)).
Even though the specific characteristics of the external connection cannot be identi-
fied in the data, I will consider the external links as a proxy for a link to a market outside
the village. The idea is that economic exchanges outside the village are more likely to
be established between anonymous agents, with the purpose of expanding the available
set of production inputs or diversifying consumption, and, even if no money is used as
a medium of exchange, involving relative prices agreed by the agents. This assumption
is supported by the evidence presented below, given that household-level variables such
as number of emigrants, remittance reception, and marriages with outsiders are uncor-
related with the probability of having an external link. On the other hand, households
involved in the production of cash crops are more likely to have external connections.
Informal interviews in the field as well as reports provided by the local enumerators also
confirm that this assumption is likely to be true.
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In the third panel of table 2, Exti(m) is summarized. Only 24% of the households
have an external-in link and 17% an external-out in any of the four economic networks
(fifth row of table 2). In the case of LAND, 5% of the households give out plots to
outsiders, while 8% get land from other villages. For LABOR, the database only has
information about the households with members working outside the village.8 Just 3%
of the households work outside the village. For the links in the INPUT network, 8%
of the respondents declared getting input from outsiders, just 3% to give out. A similar
disproportion is observed for CREDIT , where 12% obtained money from outside the
village and just 5% acted as money lenders.
4 Empirical strategy
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to test the transformation process of rural
economies that are exposed to the possibility of more complex types of exchanges outside
the village. Using the detailed database about network of economic exchanges described
above, two hypotheses of the transformation process will be tested: (H1 ) Households with
external economic links are less likely to be involved in economic interactions within the
village (substitutability between internal and external exchanges); and (H2 ) Households
with external economic links are less likely to be involved in reciprocated exchanges with
fellow villagers (reciprocation versus market hypothesis).
The network measures to be used in the analysis have been described in the last sec-
tion. External economic interactions are measured with the binary variable Extiv(m),
which takes value 1 if a household declared to have an external link in network m, zero
otherwise. The main dependent variable used to test H1 is the household-level degree
centrality in each network, di(m), which measures the level of economic interactions
within the village. In the case of H2, the level of reciprocal exchanges is quantified with
the reciprocal degree (Recipi(m)).
4.1 Propensity score matching
It is to be expected that households with external links are different from those that do not
have external connections. In order to understand which household-level characteristics
are related to the the probability of Extiv(m) = 1, the following model is estimated:
Pr(Extiv(m)) = G(αv +Xivβx) (1)
where the dependent variable can be a link to bring something to village v (Extiniv(m))
or to take out something/someone outside (Extoutiv (m)). In addition to the probability of
an external link in each of the m networks, the probability of an external link in any of
the economic networks will be estimated. G(⋅) is the logistic function and Xiv is a vector
8The lack of information related to external hiring is unfortunate, because the use of strange farmers
is an important way of dealing with labor shortages (Swindell, 1978). In terms of the definition of
households working outside the village, the original question was “Did you, or any members of your
household, work for other households during the last year (2008-9)? If yes, how many days?”. Only
households that worked at least one week during last year outside the village are considered as having
an external link.
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of controls at the household level. To control for village-level unobserved heterogeneity,
in all the estimations village fixed effects are included (αv).9
In order to test H1 and H2 in a set of households with balanced observable char-
acteristics, I use the predicted values from Equation 1 as propensity scores to match
households with similar probability of having an external link. For each i with Exti = 1
a comparison group is estimated using households without external links which have a
close propensity score. This is implemented only in the subgroup of observations that
are in the common support of the propensity scores. For the main results, the k -nearest
neighbors matching estimator is reported, with k = 3 (Abadie et al., 2004), and the stan-
dard errors are bootstrapped to take into account the fact that values are estimated.10
If the creation of an external link is completely determined by the household character-
istics included in Equation 1, then the results for the matching estimators can be taken as
the causal estimate of the average treatment effect of Exti(m) = 1 on household’s degree
and reciprocal degree. Nevertheless, it is likely that unobservable household character-
istics jointly determine the dependent variables as well as the existence of an external
link. Given this concern, the results must interpreted as the differences in di(m) and
Recipi(m) for a set of households with and without external links that are comparable
according to observable characteristics.
4.2 Linear model
To further analyze H1 at the household-level, I will follow Banerjee et al. (2012), in
their the reduced-form specification, by using measures of network centrality in a linear
specification of the following form:11
div(m)
nv − 1 = αmv +Xivβmx +Extiv(m)βmext + eiv, (2)
where the dependent variable, household’s degree, is expressed in terms of the total
possible links that a household can have in each village v.12 The vector of coefficients of
interest is βmext, associated with the dummies capturing the existence of an external link
in each network m (Extiv(m)). In particular, if there is substitutability between div(m)
and Extiv(m), it is expected that βmext < 0. Village-level fixed effects (αv) are included,
as well as Xiv, the vector of household-level characteristics already described above. eiv
is the disturbance term.
9Given the dependent variable is binary, the estimated coefficients can suffer the incidental parameters
problem. One alternative to solve this concern is the use of the conditional likelihood function estimator,
that in this case will take the form L =∏60v=1 Pr (Ext1v,...,Extnv∑ni=1Extiv ). In the Appendix (Table A.1) is shown
that estimating Equation 1 with this specification barely change the results.
10If different number of k are used or if the kernel matching estimator is implemented instead, the
results (available upon request), even though different in magnitude, have a similar interpretation.
11Banerjee et al. (2012) use the eigenvector centrality in their study of microfinance diffusion in Indian
villages, and show that their results are different if degree centrality is used instead. This is the case
given their data are for (subsamples) of networks with many more nodes than the network data from
Gambian villages. Given networks are much smaller for the latter, and therefore indirect connections
are not so relevant, eigenvector and degree centrality are very similar (Borgatti, 2005).
12If instead div(m) is used as dependent variable, the main results are unchanged.
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In the same spirit of Equation 2, the relationship of reciprocation and external con-
nections (H2 ) is tested using the following specification:
Recipiv(m)
div(m) = αmv +Xivβmx +Extiv(m)βmext2 + eiv, (3)
where the dependent variable is the proportion of reciprocated links over the total
links of households i in network m.
To account for the fact that observations are likely to be correlated within each vil-
lage, in both specifications the standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
A potential concern with the estimation of Equations 2 and 3 is the fact that the de-
pendent variable is a fraction that can take values between 1 and 0, but the predicted val-
ues from an OLS estimation can lie outside this interval. To check if this poses a problem,
I will follow Papke and Wooldridge (2008) in implementing a version of these equations
with a probit specification estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood and controlling
village unobserved heterogeneity by using the Mundlak-Chamberlain device. Therefore,
instead of the αv vector, the average of all the village-variant variables (Xv and Extv) are
included. Using this specification has no effect on the interpretation of the main results
when compared to the OLS estimates, in terms of the sign and statistical significance of
βext, and therefore I will prefer the OLS estimation which coefficients are easier to in-
terpret (the results of the Mundlak-Chamberlain estimates are reported in the Appendix).
4.3 Potential bias of the linear model
The estimation of Equation 2 using OLS yields βmext that are consistent estimators of the
effect of external links on the degree of internal exchanges when cov(Extiv(m), eiv) = 0
and cov(Xiv, eiv) = 0. Nonetheless, as already mentioned, it is likely that household un-
observed characteristics are related to the existence of links in both internal and external
networks, and therefore cov(Extiv(m), eiv) ≠ 0. If µi denotes the omitted variable, house-
hold level unobservable characteristics, then the disturbance term in Equation 2 can be
re-written as:
eiv = µiσ + uiv, (4)
where uiv is iid and σ is the coefficient that captures the effect of µi on the dependent
variable. In the case when Extiv(m) is one variable (to avoid assumptions related to the
covariances within Extiv(m) when taken as a vector), if the usual OLS assumptions hold
(including cov(Xiv, eiv) = 0) and Xiv relates to Extiv(m) only through its relationship
with unobservables, then plim β̂mext = βmext+σ cov(Extiv(m),µi)var(Extiv(m)) . Therefore, if it is expected that
µi will affect degree and external links in the same direction (σ and cov(Extiv(m), µi)
have the same sign), for example through entrepreneurial ability, empathy or assiduous-
ness, then β̂mext will be upward biased. In this case, if in the estimation of Equation 2
β̂mext < 0 is obtained, then βmext is indeed negative and the coefficient obtained is an upper
bound of its true magnitude. It is more difficult to think in terms of cases when it is
expected that µi affects internal and external exchanges in opposite directions (maybe
some kind of asymmetric information problem in which villagers know that i is dishonest
but people outside do not), but if this is the case then β̂mext will be downward biased and
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when negative coefficients are found it is not possible to know if the sign is only due to
the bias or not.
The same concerns in terms of the endogeneity of the external links variables are valid
for Equation 3. The sign of the coefficients can only be interpreted in a causal way if
µi is correlated with both Recipi(m) and Extiv(m) in the same direction (and the other
assumptions stated above also hold), and consequently β̂mext2 < 0 is an upper bound of
the true unbiased value. It is again reasonable to expect that this assumption holds.
If the unobservable characteristics mentioned above are associated with the fact that a
household has an external link and also to a higher degree in the internal networks, it
is likely that, in the context of a gift economy, they also relate to active reciprocated
exchanges with fellow villagers. Nevertheless, if µi affects Recipi(m) and Extiv(m) in
opposite ways, the sign of the coefficients may be driven by the inconsistency of the es-
timators.
Ideally, an instrumental variable will be used to deal with this potential endogeneity
problem, but it is extremely unlikely to find in the data a household level variable zi
that will credibly meet the requirements of cov(zi, eiv) = 0 and cov(zi,Extiv(m)) ≠ 0.
Household-specific random effects are not feasible either, because the likely endogeneity
of the external links implies that it will be correlated with the random effects. Therefore,
if the expected result (βmext < 0) is obtained, its sign can be interpreted in a causal way
only if the assumption of unobservable characteristics to be related with internal and
external exchanges in the same direction holds.
4.4 Dyadic regressions
So far, network based variables have been aggregated at the household level, therefore
missing part of the richness of these detailed data. In order to better understand the
transformation process at a more disaggregated level, the variables related to the proba-
bility of a link will be explored. In the case of H1, the formation of a link `ij(m) with a
fellow villager is estimated using the following dyadic model:
`ijv(m) = G(αv +wijvβdyad +Extijvβextdyad + (Xiv +Xjv)βsum + ∣Xiv −Xjv ∣βdif) (5)
where the dependent variable is the undirected binary measure of a link between i
and j (therefore in this case `ijv(m) = `jiv(m)).13 To preserve symmetry on the right-
hand-side, I follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) by specifying: βdif as the coefficient
associated with the absolute value of the difference in attributes between i and j and
βsum to the sum of their attributes (for variables like household size, head’s age, income,
etc.), and βdyad as the parameter associated with the variable wijv that corresponds to
common characteristics of i and j (like kinship and ethnic group). As for the coefficient
associated with Extijv (βextdyad) two kinds of dummies are included: One Extij(m) when
only one household in the dyad has an external link, and Two Extij(m) when this is the
13The directed probability of link formation can also be estimated, but given the interest in this case
is to study the existence of an economic exchange within the village, the undirected measure has a more
direct interpretation
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case for both (therefore the comparison group is dyads without external links).14
The dyadic framework is also helpful for dealing with the problem of potential bias in
the estimation given omitted unobserved household characteristics. Since every household
i can have links with many fellow villagers j, it is possible to include household fixed
effects. Including αi directly in Equation 5 may imply the potential problem of incidental
parameters, namely the inconsistency in the estimation of the household fixed effects
can be ‘transmitted’ to inconsistency in the estimation of the other parameters. One
alternative to address this issue is the estimation of the conditional likelihood function,
as proposed by Chamberlain (1980), that in this case will take the following form:
L = nv∏
i=1 Pr (`1jv(m), ..., `nvjv(m)∑nvj=1 `ijv(m) ) , (6)
that can be estimated only for the sub-sample of households where ∑nvj=1 `ijv(m) ≠ 0,
therefore those with at least one link in each network.
Even though individual household characteristics (including unobservables) are con-
trolled for in this model, it cannot be ruled out that in the dyadic specification household-
pair-level unobservables still introduce a bias in the estimates.
In the case of H2, the dyadic model will take the following form:
Recipijv = αv +wijvβdyad +Extijvβext2 + (Xiv +Xjv)βsum + ∣Xiv −Xjv ∣βdif + ijv (7)
where Recipijv = 1 if households i and j, from village v, have a reciprocated link, and
Recipijv = 0 if the link between i and j is non-reciprocated. This specification differs with
respect to Equation 5 because those dyads without a link (that represent around 99% of
the sample) are not considered. Otherwise, the right hand side variables are all symetric
and expressed in a similar fashion as in the dyadic Equation 5. Of particular relevance is
the fact that wijv variables, including kinship, are controlled for, given the evidence from
Table 10 that most reciprocate exchanges are within the extended family.
Unfortunately, given very small within household variation in terms of the partners,
it is not possible to estimate Equation 7 using the conditional likelihood in the spirit of
Equation 6 to control for household specific unobservables.
5 Main results
5.1 Who has external connections?
The data described in Table 2 shows that few villagers have external links. Therefore
the question arises, who are these villagers? The results of the estimation of Equation
1 are presented in Table 3, where only variables that are interesting from an economic
14In these estimations, the disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated across observations involving
the same individual using the two-dimensional clustering methodology proposed by Cameron et al. (2011)
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perspective and which are statistically significant are shown. Household size is positively
associated with the existence of an external link for most networks. The level of educa-
tion of the household head is negatively correlated with external links in some networks.
For instance, the result in column 5 suggests that educated individuals are less likely
to work outside the village, a result that can be explained by the fact that those who
have the comparative advantage of basic education inside the village tend to work there.
Income per capita increases the probability of external exchanges only in terms of credit.
Ethnic minorities (in this case considered as those that represent an ethnic group which
constitutes less than a third of villages’ population) are more likely to get land and work
outside the village. Older households are less likely to give credit.
Traditional roles are very important in rural Gambia, reflecting the importance of
social norms. The Alkalo is more likely to lend land and inputs outside the village, while
the members of the Village Development Council (VDC, an important organization that
coordinates the most important village groups) also have a higher chance of exchanging
land and receiving credit from outside. Nevertheless, households that are relatives of the
Alkalo are less likely to be involved in external credit, a fact probably related to their
favorable position for accessing cash inside the village. The Imam, village religious leader,
is less likely to work outside the village but has a higher probability of giving out inputs.
The results in Table 3 provide support to the idea that the external links in the four
economic networks are a proxy for market exchanges, where interactions with anonymous
agents prevail. All the variables measuring the existence of relatives and friends outside
the village -as is the case for number of emigrants, the reception of remittances and
marriage exchanges outside the village (to bring and send family members)- are either
statistically insignificant or have a negative coefficient as determinants of the probability
of an external link.15 Additionally, households that produce some kind of cash crop,
and therefore are more likely to be involved in market exchanges, indeed have a higher
probability of an external link (even though this is not always statistically significant).
5.2 The relationship between internal and external exchanges
In this section I concentrate on the relationship between internal and external exchanges
as expressed in H1.
The initial descriptive statistics show that there is no statistical difference in terms of
internal autarky (di(m) = 0) between households with and without external links (fourth
panel of Table 2). But this general comparison ignores a great deal of network- and
household-level heterogeneity. Table 4 shows the differences in dini (m) and douti (m) be-
tween households that have external links in any of the four networks (Exti = 1) and
those that do not have it (Exti = 0). The rows labeled as simple show the average degree
and a t-test of the difference between both kinds of households. It can be seen that the
differences are statistically significant in various networks, but no clear trend is observed
in terms of which kind of household has higher degree. For instance, in the case of Extouti ,
the in-degree is higher on average for households without external links for LAND, while
15The only exceptions are for input given out in the case of the coefficient for Extiniv (MARRIAGE)
and labor for the coefficient of Extoutiv (MARRIAGE)
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the opposite is true for LABOR and INPUT .
Households with and without external links are unlikely to be directly comparable.
A first approach to address this concern is to create a balanced comparison group (with
respect to observable household characteristics) using the matching estimator described
in Section 4.1. In the rows labeled as matched of Table 4 the difference between the
average degree for the groups of households with Exti = 1 and the estimated comparison
group is shown (only for the subsample of observations that are in the common support
of the propensity score). It is possible to see that, when the estimated comparison group
is used, all the differences in the internal degree become statistically insignificant.
In a similar fashion as in Table 4, Table 5 compares the degree of households with
external links in each individual network (Exti(m) = 1) with both the observed and the
estimated comparison group of households without external links in that particular m
network (Exti(m) = 0). The degrees reported in Table 5 are only those of the network
m (for instance, when Exti(LAND) is analyzed, just the differences in di(LAND) are
reported in Table 5). Interestingly, many of the differences in degree are negative and
statistically significant for both the simple and the matched groups. This is the case par-
ticularly when the degree as borrower (dini ) is considered. On the other hand, when the
differences in degree for networks other than the ones with external degree are considered,
no significant results are found when the matched groups are compared (Appendix Table
A.2).
The results in Table 5 provide initial evidence of substitutability between internal
exchanges and external connections, but only in the case of internal borrowers and only
for degree within the same network m with the external link Exti(m).
An alternative technique to explore H1 at the household-level is the model pre-
sented in Equation 2. The estimates using OLS are displayed in Table 6, where only
the values for βext are reported. In the upper panel, Extiv(m) is defined as only one
variable, taken value 1 if there is an external link in each particular network, while in
the lower panel Extiv(m) is the vector of all possible external links in all networks m.
The results in Table 6 are very much in line with those obtained from the comparison
of matched samples in Table 5: external links tend to be negatively related to house-
hold’s internal degree within each network m, but unrelated in the rest of the networks.
βext is negative for LAND, except in the Extouti (LAND)-douti (LAND) combination, for
LABOR only in the Extouti (LABOR)-douti (LABOR) combination, for INPUT always
except in Extouti (INPUT )-douti (INPUT ) and for CREDIT only in Extini (CREDIT )-
dini (CREDIT ). Given the average div(m)n−1 is around 0.01 in most of the networks, the
existence of external links is associated to a reduction on internal degree which ranges
between 4% and 9%.16
Given potential endogeneity problems, the magnitudes of βmext in Table 2 must be
taken as the conditional correlation between internal degree and external connections,
and its sign can only be interpreted in causal terms under the assumptions stated in
section 4.3.
16Table A.3 of the Appendix displays the results of the estimation of the fractional linear model using
the specification of Papke and Wooldridge (2008). The main results remain unchanged.
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Going from the household- to the link-level, the estimation of the parameters of Equa-
tion 5 (only for βextdyad) are presented in Table 7. The simple logit estimation including
village dummies (DYADIC LOGIT) is compared to the estimation using the conditional
likelihood function of Equation 6 (DYADIC CONDITIONAL LOGIT). It can be seen
that, even the sample size is not the same, both models yield very similar results. In
the case of LAND and INPUT , the probability of a link is a decreasing function of the
external links within each network (but not statistically significant in the case of One
Extoutij (m)). This is not the case for LABOR and CREDIT . While all all the within
network parameters that are statistically significant are negative, it is also possible to
see some effects across networks, given that βextdyad for other networks than m are also
significant in some cases, with not clear prediction regarding the sign.17
It is not possible to directly compare the results from the household-level model of
Equation 2 and the dyadic model, but the fact that the negative effect of external links
on internal economic interaction is present in both specifications provides further ev-
idence that omitted household-level unobserved characteristics do not necessarily drive
the results. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that in the dyadic specification household-
pair-level unobservables are introducing biases in the estimates.
5.3 Reciprocation versus market
In this section the focus is on H2, namely, under the presence of market connections (i.e.
external links) the reciprocal exchanges that characterize traditional economic relations
will tend to be reduced.
In Table 8 a similar procedure as in tables 4 and 5 of the last section is followed.
The differences in reciprocal out − degree (Recipouti (m)) and in − degree (Recipini (m))
are compared between households with and without external links, in both the observed
and the matched comparison group. As was the case in Table 4, the upper panel of Table
8 shows that no significant differences are found when Exti, a link in any network, is
considered (only the results for reciprocal degree in any network are reported, but also
no significant differences are obtained when reciprocal degree in each network m is con-
sidered). This is in contrast to the results of the lower panels of Table 8, where again it
is possible to see that the differences are significant when reciprocation within the same
network with the external link is analyzed. In the case of Extini , most of the differences
are significant or close to significant and always negative. In the case of Extouti , only the
difference for Recipouti (LABOR) is significant, and also negative. When it comes to the
differences in Recipi(m) for networks others than the one with the external link, again no
significant results (with very few exceptions) are found, as reported in Appendix Table
A.4.
The results in Table 8 offer initial evidence of the reduction in reciprocity under the
influence of external connections, particularly when used to bring something to the vil-
lage. Nevertheless, the same concerns as above in terms of the causal interpretation of
17There are 2,828 links for LAND, 3,546 for LABOR, 5,401 for INPUT , and 2,598 in the case of
CREDIT .
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the result are valid here.
The results of the OLS estimation of Equation 3 (only for βmext) are reported in Table
9. Apart from the estimation of Recipouti (m) and Recipini (m), the proportion of total
reciprocated links over total degree, Recipi, is also reported in the third column of each
network. The preliminary evidence from Table 8 is partially reproduced here. For LAND
and CREDIT , βext2 is negative for Extiniv(m), but for LABOR and INPUT the opposite
is true, with statistically significant βext2 < 0 when Extoutiv (m) = 1. In the specification of
Extiniv(m) as the vector of all possible external links (lower panel of Table 9), it can be
seen that there are some cross-networks effects of external links, given that some of the
coefficients for networks others than the dependent variable are statistically significant,
always with a negative sign (excepts for Extoutiv (CREDIT ) in LAND).18
Aggregating reciprocation data to the household-level hides important link-level het-
erogeneity. Table 10 presents a detailed summary of all the links registered in the four
economic networks, with particular attention to the fact if the link was reciprocated or
not (Recipij(m)). The information is disaggregated according to: whether the household
that formed the link has external links or not; whether each link was formed to borrow
out or lend in within the village economic networks; and whether the link was estab-
lished between households that are close relatives (family) or not. Around 65% of the
links described in Table 10 are formed by households that do not have any external link
(Exti(m) = 0). These households also have more reciprocated links. When links with
all the villagers are considered, households without external links reciprocate around half
of the links while those with external links only reciprocate between 41% to 43%. The
only exceptions are households that are external lenders and internal borrowers, which
display even more reciprocity than those only exchanging internally (53.5%). When links
are divided between exchanges within and ouside the family, it is possible to see that
the differences in reciprocity are mainly associated with the former group. Links with
relatives are reciprocated more than half of the time, but more intensively for households
with only internal links. On the other hand, the level of reciprocation is similar for all
groups if links with non-relatives are considered.
In Table 11 the link summary is presented by network. The external links are consid-
ered only in the case a household has links outside the village in each particular network
m. LAND and CREDIT are reciprocated in less than 30% of the cases on average, while
LABOR and INPUT have reciprocation in around half of the links. The latter networks
are actively reciprocated within the same network, among them and also with LAND
and CREDIT . In terms of the differences between links created by households with and
without external links, the previous evidence is confirmed in various combinations: links
created by the former group are, in general, reciprocated less. This is particularly the
case when the external link is created to bring something to the village, and the effects
are more pronounced for the LABOR and INPUT networks.
To further explore H2 at the link level (therefore considering the characteristics of the
dyad partner), Table 12 displays the coefficients obtained for βext2 in the dyadic model
of Equation 7. Some of the findings obtained for the household-level results in Equation
18In Table A.5 of the Appendix is possible to see that the main results do not change if the fractional
linear model is estimated using the specification of Papke and Wooldridge (2008).
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3 are confirmed at the link-level. For various specifications, the probability of creating
a reciprocated link is negatively related to Extijv. βext2 < 0 for LAND and CREDIT
when Extinijv is considered, and for INPUT when Ext
out
ijv is taken into account (in the
case of the latter, only significant at the 12% level). It is interesting that the effect is
particularly pronounced in those networks where reciprocation is less prevalent (Table
11), a fact that may be related to endogenous preferences and cultural norms.19
6 Conclusions
A long tradition of anthropological studies have described the characteristics of primitive
economies based on reciprocal exchanges, known as gift economies, and how this type of
transaction tends to be reduced when more complex exchange mechanisms exist. This
transformation process is formalized in the model introduced by Kranton (1996). Nev-
ertheless, little rigorous empirical evidence has been provided to support the qualitative
evidence and the predictions from the model. In order to fill this gap, the present study
takes advantage of a unique dataset of social and economic networks collected in 60 rural
Gambian villages to analyze the ways in which households with links outside the village
(interpreted as a proxy for market connections) behave in the locally available exchange
networks for land, labor, input and credit.
The main results, from econometric specifications at both household- and dyadic-level,
provide evidence supporting the predictions of the transformation process. In particular,
it is found that: (i) households with external economic links are less likely to be involved
in economic interactions within the village (substitutability between internal and external
exchanges); and (ii) households with external economic links are less likely to be involved
in reciprocated exchanges with fellow villagers (reciprocation versus market hypothesis).
In the case of the substitutability between internal and external exchanges, the results
are mainly driven by within-network effects, given that cross-network coefficients are sta-
tistically insignificant (e.g. an external link in the network of inputs of production is a
substitute of an internal link in the inputs exchange but this is not the case for the other
economic exchange networks). In terms of reciprocation versus market, the analysis also
provides evidence of within-network substitution, but jointly with some cross-network
effects. The results are robust to different econometric specifications and alternative
methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the village- and household-level, but
the effects are not always present in every network.
The findings suggest some important policy implications. The goal of many rural de-
velopment programs is the integration of isolated communities into market transactions.
In other words, using a network framework, there is an effort to create external links
that connect currently missing markets. To explain why many of these programs fail,
theoretical models have proposed that the benefits of market transactions may not be
enough to abandon the traditional means of exchange and production (de Janvry et al.,
1991; Kranton, 1996). Therefore, it is necessary to consider the complexities of commu-
nity exchanges in order to understand the effects of market-oriented interventions. For
19Given very small within household variation in terms of the partners, it is not possible to estimate
Equation 7 using conditional logit.
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instance, von Braun and Webb (1989) and Carney and Watts (1990) have shown how
in The Gambia many programs that attempted to increase agricultural productivity and
cash crop production failed because the traditional distribution of land was not considered
in the design. The results I have presented suggest that the existence of external links is
related to a decrease in the exchanges within the village, and particularly of reciprocated
exchanges with fellow villagers. If policies oriented to the creation of external links are
implemented, undesired effects, such as the reduction in community interactions and the
isolation of villagers not willing to abandon the gift exchange system, can be the source
of renewed failures in attempts at rural development.
The study of the transformation of rural societies using a network perspective have
the potential to improve the understanding of the overall economic development pro-
cess. Exploring whether the results of the present contribution hold in different settings,
and improving data collection and analysis to overcome its limitations, represent fruitful
avenues for future research.
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Table 1: HOUSEHOLD DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Household Size 12.67 11.40 1 400
Age of household head 51.70 15.54 15 100
Female Household head 0.06 0.25 0 1
Formal Education 0.16 0.37 0 1
Compound head 0.84 0.37 0 1
Polygamous 0.46 0.50 0 1
Monogamous 0.48 0.50 0 1
Relatives in the village (%) 0.09 0.09 0 0.73
Non Muslim 0.04 0.19 0 1
Ethnic minority 0.19 0.40 0 1
Workers in the household 1.27 0.66 0 6
Agricultural land (hectares) 8.06 21.22 0 400
Land per worker (hectares) 2.27 7.40 0 133
Income per capita (GMD) 3,514 4,735 43 125,000
Agricultural income (% of total) 0.12 0.24 0 1
Emigrants 0.48 0.50 0 1
Cash crops sellers 0.41 0.49 0 1
Remittances receivers 0.19 0.39 0 1
VILLAGE ROLE
Alkalo 0.02 0.14 0 1
Alkalo’s relative 0.35 0.48 0 1
Alkalo’s assistant 0.04 0.20 0 1
VDC member 0.19 0.39 0 1
Elders council member 0.19 0.39 0 1
Traditional healer 0.20 0.40 0 1
Griot (storyteller) 0.01 0.12 0 1
Imam 0.02 0.14 0 1
Marabout 0.02 0.14 0 1
Note: Household-level descriptive statistics. 2,810 observations for each
variable. A fully detailed description of the variables can be found in
Jaimovich (2011a).
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Table 10: LINKS SUMMARY: RECIPROCITY IN ALL ECO-
NOMIC NETWORKS
External links Exti(m) = 0 Extini (m) = 1 Extouti (m) = 1
Internal links Borrow Lend Borrow Lend Borrow Lend
LINKS WITH ALL VILLAGERS
Total links 4815 4528 1764 1879 1128 1383
Reciprocated 47.9% 50.9% 43.6% 40.9% 53.5% 43.7%
Non-reciprocated 52.1% 49.1% 56.4% 59.1% 46.5% 56.3%
LINKS WITH NON-FAMILY
Total links 2889 2712 1012 1069 676 845
Reciprocated 35.1% 37.4% 36.6% 34.6% 45.0% 36.0%
Non-reciprocated 64.9% 62.6% 63.4% 65.4% 55.0% 64.0%
LINKS WITH FAMILY
Total links 1926 1816 752 810 452 538
Reciprocated 67.0% 71.1% 56.3% 51.8% 66.4% 55.8%
Non-reciprocated 33.0% 28.9% 43.7% 48.2% 33.6% 44.2%
Note: Summary of all the links registered in the four economic networks
(LAND, LABOR, INPUT and CREDIT ). Based on 2,810 households.
32
Table 11: LINKS SUMMARY: RECIPROCITY BY NETWORK
External links Exti(m) = 0 Extini (m) = 1 Extouti (m) = 1
Internal links Borrow Lend Borrow Lend Borrow Lend
LAND
Total links 1305 1228 71 49 38 137
Reciprocated with:
LAND 3.4% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 4.4%
LABOR 10.2% 9.6% 4.2% 10.2% 0.0% 9.5%
INPUT 8.4% 8.2% 7.0% 4.1% 7.9% 10.2%
CREDIT 3.1% 3.7% 7.0% 0.0% 5.3% 1.5%
Non-reciprocated 74.9% 74.8% 81.7% 85.7% 71.1% 74.5%
LABOR
Total links 1664 1711 109 62
Reciprocated with:
LAND 7.1% 7.8% 16.5% 4.8%
LABOR 11.6% 11.3% 2.8% 4.8%
INPUT 20.3% 20.0% 12.8% 14.5%
CREDIT 8.0% 7.9% 5.5% 6.5%
Non-reciprocated 53.1% 53.1% 62.4% 69.4%
INPUT
Total links 2452 2396 183 184 61 125
Reciprocated with:
LAND 4.2% 4.3% 6.0% 6.0% 3.3% 4.8%
LABOR 13.4% 13.2% 10.9% 11.4% 8.2% 12.8%
INPUT 47.6% 48.7% 25.7% 25.5% 59.0% 28.8%
CREDIT 5.9% 6.3% 3.8% 3.8% 11.5% 2.4%
Non-reciprocated 28.9% 27.5% 53.6% 53.3% 18.0% 51.2%
CREDIT
Total links 1142 1046 94 173 60 83
Reciprocated with:
LAND 3.9% 4.0% 1.1% 2.9% 5.0% 1.2%
LABOR 11.0% 11.0% 6.4% 9.2% 15.0% 12.0%
INPUT 12.3% 12.6% 10.6% 8.1% 15.0% 15.7%
CREDIT 2.8% 3.1% 1.1% 0.6% 1.7% 1.2%
Non-reciprocated 69.9% 69.3% 80.9% 79.2% 63.3% 69.9%
Note: Summary of all the links registered in the four economic networks
(LAND, LABOR, INPUT and CREDIT ). Based on 2,810 households.
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Table 12: DYADIC REGRESSION FOR RECIPROCATED LINKS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recipij(LAND) Recipij(LABOR) Recipij(INPUT ) Recipij(CREDIT )
One Extoutij (LAND) 0.146 0.127 0.297 0.065
(0.393) (0.289) (0.240) (0.364)
One Extinij (LAND) -0.570 -0.436 0.025 -0.281
(0.351) (0.309) (0.242) (0.381)
Two Extoutij (LAND) -0.519 0.469 0.776* 1.173
(0.896) (0.540) (0.420) (0.796)
Two Extinij (LAND) -2.074* -0.598 -0.259 -0.455
(1.237) (0.557) (0.562) (0.779)
One Extoutij (LABOR) 0.323 -0.001 -0.168 -0.169
(0.311) (0.239) (0.214) (0.309)
Two Extoutij (LABOR) -0.485 -0.054 0.065 0.022
(0.570) (0.655) (0.523) (0.795)
One Extoutij (INPUT ) -0.621 -0.252 -0.412 -0.027
(0.420) (0.300) (0.273) (0.393)
One Extinij (INPUT ) -0.036 -0.492* 0.133 -0.528*
(0.320) (0.276) (0.222) (0.315)
Two Extinij (INPUT ) 1.358** -0.578 -0.567 0.057
(0.655) (0.643) (0.589) (0.731)
One Extoutij (CREDIT ) 0.392 0.309 -0.143 0.029
(0.346) (0.244) (0.240) (0.369)
One Extinij (CREDIT ) 0.120 -0.098 -0.022 -0.775**
(0.275) (0.205) (0.168) (0.305)
Two Extoutij (CREDIT ) -0.098 -0.130 -1.127
(1.047) (1.089) (1.277)
Two Extinij (CREDIT ) 0.317 0.428 -0.171 -0.538
(0.539) (0.522) (0.511) (0.707)
Observations 1006 1162 1561 872
Households 704 780 972 575
PseudoR2 0.270 0.217 0.317 0.304
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Two-way (i and j) clustered standard errors in parentheses. Logit
estimates. Village dummies and other sums and differences of characteristics that were not statistically
significant or have limited interest were included in the estimations but their associated coefficients are not
reported.
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Table A.2: INTERNAL DEGREE FOR HOUSEHOLDS WITH AND WITH-
OUT EXTERNAL LINKS BY NETWORK (Difference in degree for networks
different than the one with external link. Only matched samples)
External in External out
Degree difference S.E. t-stat Degree difference S.E. t-stat
Exti(LAND)
d
in i
(m) LABOR 0.142 0.156 0.91 -0.156 0.170 -0.92INPUT -0.208 0.147 -1.42 -0.266 0.214 -1.24
CREDIT -0.027 0.105 -0.25 -0.023 0.090 -0.26
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LABOR 0.180 0.113 1.6 0.054 0.127 0.42INPUT 0.165 0.173 0.95 -0.051 0.239 -0.21
CREDIT 0.059 0.214 0.27 0.033 0.144 0.23
Exti(LABOR)
d
in i
(m) LAND 0.008 0.089 0.09INPUT 0.004 0.166 0.02
CREDIT -0.076 0.082 -0.92
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LAND 0.585 0.300 1.95INPUT 0.261 0.175 1.49
CREDIT -0.271 0.161 -1.68
Exti(INPUT )
d
in i
(m) LAND -0.044 0.079 -0.55 -0.017 0.096 -0.18LABOR -0.044 0.146 -0.3 -0.062 0.145 -0.43
CREDIT 0.037 0.062 0.59 -0.056 0.104 -0.54
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LAND 0.407 0.265 1.53 -0.005 0.241 -0.02LABOR 0.040 0.082 0.49 -0.087 0.133 -0.65
CREDIT -0.030 0.128 -0.24 -0.037 0.198 -0.18
Exti(CREDIT )
d
in i
(m) LAND -0.004 0.050 -0.08 -0.158 0.090 -1.76LABOR 0.002 0.085 0.02 0.146 0.189 0.77
CREDIT 0.101 0.084 1.21 -0.051 0.183 -0.28
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LAND 0.108 0.115 0.95 0.750 0.466 1.61LABOR 0.031 0.058 0.53 0.158 0.129 1.22
CREDIT 0.018 0.095 0.19 0.190 0.209 0.91
Differences in the average degree of households with and without external links and the
t-test of its difference when the comparison group is estimated using k -nearest-neighbor
matching estimator, with k = 3. Only observations on the common support of the
propensity score are considered and the standard errors of the estimated comparison
group are bootstrapped.
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Table A.4: RECIPROCATED LINKS FOR HOUSEHOLDS WITH AND
WITHOUT EXTERNAL LINKS BY NETWORK (Difference in reciprocal-
degree for networks different than the one with external link. Only matched
samples)
External in External out
Degree difference S.E. t-stat Degree difference S.E. t-stat
Exti(LAND)
R
ec
ip
in i LABOR 0.030 0.085 0.35 0.107 0.092 1.16
INPUT 0.002 0.135 0.01 0.168 0.160 1.05
CREDIT -0.015 0.048 -0.31 -0.016 0.050 -0.33
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LABOR 0.000 0.065 0 0.047 0.072 0.65
INPUT 0.026 0.143 0.18 0.107 0.163 0.66
CREDIT 0.048 0.058 0.83 0.089 0.066 1.34
Exti(LABOR)
R
ec
ip
in i LAND -0.041 0.039 -1.07
INPUT 0.128 0.126 1.02
CREDIT -0.075 0.044 -1.72
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LAND 0.077 0.070 1.1
INPUT 0.124 0.130 0.96
CREDIT -0.032 0.057 -0.56
Exti(INPUT )
R
ec
ip
in i LAND 0.015 0.032 0.48 -0.018 0.052 -0.35
LABOR 0.012 0.060 0.2 0.032 0.072 0.44
CREDIT -0.061 0.031 -1.94 -0.063 0.044 -1.42
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LAND 0.047 0.058 0.81 -0.117 0.056 -2.08
LABOR -0.064 0.044 -1.45 -0.072 0.060 -1.2
CREDIT -0.051 0.038 -1.34 0.036 0.063 0.57
Exti(CREDIT )
R
ec
ip
in i LAND 0.021 0.026 0.81 -0.039 0.041 -0.95
LABOR 0.056 0.052 1.07 0.128 0.108 1.19
CREDIT -0.057 0.090 -0.63 0.104 0.152 0.69
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LAND 0.058 0.041 1.43 0.179 0.091 1.97
LABOR -0.025 0.039 -0.62 -0.030 0.072 -0.41
CREDIT -0.033 0.093 -0.35 0.185 0.159 1.16
Differences in the average reciprocal degree of households with and without external
links and the t-test of its difference when the comparison group is estimated using k -
nearest-neighbor matching estimator, with k = 3. Only observations on the common
support of the propensity score are considered and the standard errors of the estimated
comparison group are bootstrapped.
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